

*Thinking like Grass, with Deleuze in Education?*¹

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Any beginning is difficult. To begin to talk about Gilles Deleuze is particularly difficult. For one thing, he is a philosopher of immense learning which is tightly tied to his rich studies in French or European intellectual history. He confessed to Michel Cressole in his 1973 letter: "I belong to a generation, one of the last generations, that was more or less bludgeoned to death with the history of philosophy... I myself 'did' history of philosophy for a long time, read books on this or that author" (Neg., p. 5-6). Indeed, this aspect of his learning is evident in any of his writings. Hence, for someone like me who had meager background in philosophy and in French literature, to start to read Deleuze was and still is a difficult endeavour. Secondly, Deleuze was an experimenter, a player [*joueur*]. Not only did he play with canonical works handed down from the past in the western philosophical tradition, ranging from his earlier studies on and with work of Hume, Nietzsche, then Kant, Bergson, Spinoza, and later Leibniz (in the order of his related publications), but he also experimented with thinking beyond the traditional borders of philosophy. In his own words, he "compensated in various ways" (Neg., p. 5-6) in finding new rules to philosophizing. In this effort, he drew sources from and critiqued in the domain of

psychoanalysis, literature (most notably Proust, Sacher-Masoch and Kafka) as well as other areas of the arts, such as painting, theatre and cinema. And it is precisely from these works of “assemblage” traversing intellectual disciplines and artistic domains that Deleuze drew himself an immense “cartography” and conjured up many refreshing images of thought throughout his life. I began to read Deleuze by pure chance in a classroom during my exchange in France.

One cannot intend to read Deleuze’s work; one *encounters* it in the middle. And this is the best approach, according to Deleuze, “what is interesting is the middle” (Dial., p. 29), in the middle of things, in the middle of worlds. So, let’s forget about what we were reading before, what questions were on our mind; forget about what we plan to do – and what answers we can expect – just suspending ourselves in this deliciously luxurious cloud of ignorance. Forget everything. Know nothing. We are in a foreign territory...

Suppose you happen to turn to page 27 in Deleuze’s *Dialogues II* with the chapter title: “On the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature”, and you read the first few lines: “To leave, to escape, is to trace a line. The highest aim of literature, according to Lawrence, is ‘to leave, to leave, to escape ... to across the horizon, enter into another life... It is thus that Melville finds himself in the middle of the Pacific. He has really crossed the line of the horizon.’ The line of flight is a deterritorialization.” We are literally in the middle of Deleuzian thought. *Dialogues II* is a book composed by Deleuze with his former student and then colleague Claire Parnet, originally published in France in 1977. As Deleuze explained in his preface to the English edition, this is a book written between the two well-known books that he co-wrote with Félix Guattari, namely: *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateau*. In his own words, the ‘between’-ness of this book is not only between two books written between two persons – Deleuze himself and Guattari – there is also the ‘offshoot’ of his

conversation between himself and Parnet, a “new line-between.” A little further down the chapter, we encounter a rather striking passage:

The English and the Americans do not have the same way of beginning again as the French. French beginning again is the *tabula rasa*, the search for a primary certainty as a point of origin, always the point of anchor. The other way of beginning again, on the other hand, is to take up the interrupted line, to join a segment to the broken line, to make it pass between two rocks in a narrow gorge, or over the top of the void, where it had stopped. It is never the beginning or the end which are interesting; the beginning and end are points. What is interesting is the middle. The English zero is always in the middle. Bottlenecks are always in the middle. Being in the middle of a line is the most uncomfortable position. One begins again through the middle... Trees are the opposite of grass. Not only does grass grow in the middle of things, but it grows itself through the middle... Grass has its line of flight, and does not take root. We have grass in the head, not a tree: what thinking signifies is what the brain is, a ‘particular nervous system’ of grass. (Dial., p. 29-30)

Now, if we could go back to the enigmatic beginning line mentioned earlier: “To leave, to escape, is to trace a line... The line of flight is a deterritorialization.” (p. 27) What strikes us so far? What has been repeated? A few words haunt us, “line”, “middle”, “beginning”, “point”, “zero”, “broken”, “flight”, “leave”, “horizon”, “trees”, “grass”, even the notion of “English” versus “French”. What does it all mean? Before we can make any meaning at all out of the text, we observe a few things: First of all, he seems to be distinguishing two different ways of

beginning: There is the French beginning, “the search for a primary certainty as a point of origin”. Then there is the English way of starting at “zero”, but then this “zero” is not at all a tracing-back of “origin”, as he says “the English zero is always in the middle”. A zero in the middle! A mathematical coordinate is the only image I know that seems to exemplify this paradox of a “middle zero” that one can place anywhere in the space. So it’s not about getting *from* point A *to* point B with any pre-determined manner. In fact, this B could well be an unknown, or better be an unknown. So unlike the French search for roots in the manner of a tree, this middle zero is an English beginning that picks up a broken line in the middle and takes a flight to escape, to cross the horizon that’s already in view, to leave for somewhere else, somewhere not yet known. In a manner of grass, not only does it spring up in the middle of a path, it also unearths itself with the fateful wind, only to show up in the middle of somewhere again. So to trace a “line of flight” as such, Deleuze calls “deterritorialization”.

We realize suddenly that Deleuze is thinking in geographic terms with botanic metaphors. Indeed, for Deleuze, “To fly is to trace a line, lines, a whole of cartography. One only discovers worlds through a long, broken flight” (p. 27). [*Carto-*] in the French etymologic dictionary indicates an origin from Latin [*charta*], which has branched into one of its meanings as the “first element of learned act of composing”. The base [*-graphy*], is connected with the word [*greffe*], a member of the family of the Greek [*graphein*] to mean *writing*. Interestingly, even the word cartography, is a crossing of paths between a Latin root and a Greek base. I don’t know if Deleuze defines cartography somewhere, but it seems to me that cartography could well be a trace /inscription/writing that is left behind in the process of deterritorialization. Or, the act of deterritorialization could well be called a process of mapping, the making of cartography. So we see that a cartography gives an image of a horizontal surface, whereas, a genealogy (of tree, of family, for instance)

gives an image of a vertical transcendence from the depth of the roots to the branches high above.

Deleuze employs these image-like conceptual terms in the context of comparative literature between French and English. Through an illustration of various Anglo-American authors' works such as D.H. Lawrence, Hermann Melville, Francis Scott Fitzgerald, Virginia Woolf, Jack Kerouac and Henry Miller, he suggests that their writing constantly shows ruptures that exemplify the process of what he calls deterritorialization, for in them "everything is departure, becoming, passage, leap, daemon, relationship with the outside" (p. 27). But clearly Deleuze does not write about the superiority of English literature for the sake of writing it, since for a French philosopher, English literature could well be an outside at least in two senses: outside of the country, outside of his discipline. One could say that Deleuze encounters an "English zero" through English literature for it serves for him as a new terrain for a beginning of thought. In so doing, he becomes the kind of (philosopher)-"nomad" that he himself calls for, since as nomads, "they have no history, they only have geography" (p. 23). Hence it is not surprising to see that this long conversation with Parnet in the form of a book dwells on diverse topics (i.e. thought-demanding geographies): not only on the terrain of English literatures but also on others such as psychoanalysis, politics and so on.²

But Deleuze's penchant for new beginnings showed itself quite early on. In one of his earlier yet very important works, *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze had dedicated one series (#18) to sketch out three images of philosophers.³ What are these images of philosophers about? Why sketch them? You may wonder, as I did. Ultimately for Deleuze, the tracing back of three kinds of images of philosophers is itself not merely an philosophical activity digging into history, but an attempt to sketch an *orientation*, which already supports his idea that "thought itself

presupposes axes and according to which it develops, that it has a geography before having a history, and that it traces dimensions before constructing systems" (LS, p. 127). And even though we modern educators don't tend to think it necessary to learn about the history of philosophy, be it Western or Eastern, as it is outside of our discipline as such, yet it is a propitious moment to learn a bit of basic knowledge of the western trajectory in philosophy, so as to better understand the highly-metaphorized images of philosophers that Deleuze has brought forth in his text. Also in so doing, some essential characteristics that associate with these images will also come to the fore and will provide a ground for further discussion on Deleuze's own "style" in philosophizing.

Platonism is the best-known image of philosophy because of its long history since the Greek Academy to its persisting domination in Western societies. Plato presented Socrates as the ideal embodiment of philosophy; hence Platonism is often called Socratic philosophy. It is Socrates, the inventor of dialectics, who reasoned rigorously often through argumentative strategies employed and taught by the Sophists in Greek antiquity. And dialectics has been the platonic method par excellence in the lineage of western philosophy, although it passed its own development through later well-known philosophers such as Descartes, Kant, Hegel. In this image, the philosopher is a being of ascents and is the one who leaves the cave and rises up.

However, following Nietzsche, Deleuze is profoundly dissatisfied with the Platonic orientation toward height. They see Socratic philosophers and their successors as tragic thinkers with Platonic wings striving for heights of transcendence. He considers them to be tragic for their "degeneracy" in philosophy from the pre-Socratics and regards the enterprise of philosophy since Plato as a sad dream that tries too hard to distinguish – the "True" (philosophers)" from the "False" (sophists), "the Original" from "copies" – "the High" from "the Low", "Soul" from

“body” – a whole series of splitting that essentially treats the body as an abject or at least not worthy of attention.

It was Nietzsche who plunged into the depths of history and dug out the pre-Socratics and found another image of philosophers that is much closer to his taste. The so-called pre-Socratics were early Greek thinkers who were active back in the sixth century B.C. They were concerned with cosmological questions in the style of so-called “natural philosophy” (*physiologia*), which is named for their close tie with the observable world by the concept of *physis* (nature), and for their stress on a basic uniformity of behavior in the natural world. Heraclitus and Parmenides (both are the Eleatics) in particular, were concerned with the problem of unity and diversity of the universe. What they differ from Platonism in philosophizing is their attachment to immediate experiences in the concrete and changing world. This ancient gesture of philosophizing, a mode of thought or a style of life, might be called a vitalistic approach to philosophy.

Essentially it's of the depth, as Deleuze characterizes it to be a philosophy with “a hammer-blow” and with “Empedocles' lead sandals”. Here, the hammer-blow is referring to these pre-Socratics who philosophized with a “hammer”, “the hammer of the geologist and speleologist” for they thought, unlike the Platonism after them, in the depth of life, “inside the caverns”. (LS, 128) Empedocles is taken as the epitome of such philosophers who plunged in the earthiness of life to contemplate the cosmos, seeking it the secret of water and fire, for instance. Empedocles' lead (or bronze, according to different authors) sandal has simply become a metonymic object for his way of philosophizing, which coincides with their anecdotes of life.⁴

Yet, for Deleuze there is another image of philosophers that draws most of his interests. It's with those “third Greeks” in their way of philosophizing that Deleuze sees an image of the surface. What Deleuze refers to here are the Cynics and the Stoics. With them, Deleuze finds a

“curious system of provocation” where they respond people’s questions by giving them a blow with their staff, if not with silences. In the case of the Cynics, although claiming a Socratic lineage, they are not the “theoretic man” that Nietzsche calls the Socratics to be. Their primary interests are ethical. The most illustrious example is Diogenes of Sinope. He fervently rejects convention [*nomos*] as to show its arbitrariness or the unreasonableness of the Athenian social norms. He is a harsh critic of Plato for his metaphysical pursuits or any theoretical ethics. The legendary interchange with Alexander the Great suffices to sketch his character: When Alexander identified himself to Diogenes of Sinope by saying “I’m Alexander the Great King”, he responds with his own “position”, “I am Diogenes the Cynic” which literally means “Diogenes the Dog”. So, what does Deleuze see in these practices of the Cynic, if not the humorous yet daring ability to beat the hidden assumptions and attitudes out of people’s lives onto the surface, taking the freedom of speech or frankness [*parrhēsia*] to be their violent and merciless staff. The Stoics represented by Chrysippus also sneer against Plato in their attempt to unseat the Ideas, but to show that “the incorporeal is not high above (en hauteur), but is rather at the surface, that it is not the highest cause but the superficial effect par excellence, and that it is not Essence but event.” (LS, p. 130) Hence, both the Cynics and the Stoics display a kind of what Deleuze names as “staff-blow philosophy (*Philosophie à coup de baton*)”, in which their philosophical values are new; their “new logos” are “animated with paradox”; and their philosophical anecdotes are no longer Platonic nor pre-Socratic (p. 130), reside neither in nature (*physis*) nor in conventions (*nomos*). They philosophize laterally from the *event* of life, from the East, where the dawn of day begins anew (p. 129).

Since Hercules is the ultimate hero of the Stoic thought “in his dual battle against both depth and height” and symbolizes a “reorientation of the entire thought and a new geography”, Deleuze’s image of the third philosopher is becoming clear: it’s about the “reversible cloak of

Hercules with his club and lion skin" (p. 132). This is the image no longer of Empedocles/Dionysus down below, nor of Socrates/Apollo up above, but of Diogenes the Cynic/Hercules of the surface. And as if these metonymic as well as metaphoric images of thought were not enough to characterize the main differences among the three orientations of philosophy, Deleuze goes further. With a *clin d'oeil*, he associates Platonic conversion with manic-depressive, pre-Socratics subversion with schizophrenia, and calls this new philosophical operation "perversion" (which he seems to link along with masochism elsewhere). And here Deleuze specifies that "perversion implies an extraordinary art of surfaces." (p. 133)

To describe it in one broad stroke then, the three images of philosophers were the result of Deleuze's surveying [*survoler*] through the pre-Socratics, Platonism, then taking up Stoics' initiative to finally reconfigure a third image: philosopher of the surface. Indeed it is here we have a glimpse of Deleuze's general maneuver of orientation as a philosopher from the vertical to the horizontal, from the depth and height to the surface, from the points of beginning or end to the middle, from the temporal (past, present, future) to the spatial (the plane of consistency, plan of immanence). Clearly, Deleuze himself, the contemporary philosopher takes on the persona of Hercules, turning towards a philosophical diversion, a "perverse" straying away, a deterritorialization that he already lived with before his eventual naming of this term.

For Deleuze, philosophy is not in the nature of a "doxical" return but a paradoxical one for it attempts to articulate something outside the order of the dominant opinion or proposition (WP, p. 80). Following Nietzsche's "monstrous" attempt to revolutionize the traditional approach to philosophy which is a rational and systematic kind of critical thinking about the general nature of the world, Deleuze traced the

history of philosophy traversing his “enemies” and/or “allies” to re-imagine a new image of thought, to reorient philosophy itself. And if the classical philosophy can be said to be “thinking about thinking”, Deleuze’s work can be seen in the question of how that “thinking about” comes about in the first place. In this long search, he has come to realize that the history of philosophy in fact has played a repressive role in thought, easily demonstrated in an authoritative voice in its reproach: “how can you think without having read Plato, Descartes, Kant and Heidegger, and so-and-so’s book about them?” Deleuze must have felt this voice coming from an imaginary yet existing fatherly figure of philosophy as he studied it. Deleuze thinks that it’s precisely this kind of weighty malaise that prevents people from truly entering the gate to a thinking-otherwise (Dial., p.10).

So in precisely this sense, Deleuze’s philosophy is strangely “non-philosophical”, it is counter-“doxography”, for it relinquishes the clinging to the dialectic discourse in its transcendence to “Truth”, as well as the Moral Image of thought which concerned philosophers such as Descartes, Kant or Hegel, great “philosophical laborers” as Nietzsche would call them. Since the time of his radical critique of this traditional Image in *The Logic of Sense* and *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze continued to embark on his line of flight to create philosophical concepts under new conditions that are, not only a departure from but “a rigorous struggle against this Image, which it would denounce as non-philosophical” (DR, p.132). To approach philosophy in a kind of non-philosophical way, Deleuze truly begins to think the unthought in “a thought without image”, with a kind of “philosophical obstinacy with no ally but paradox, one which would have to renounce both the form of representation and the element of common sense” (DR, p.132).⁵

In the last collaborative work with Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari give a “brand” to their philosophy, “Geophilosophy”. As a philosopher, Deleuze has always been concerned

with thinking, yet rather than digging into what thinking *is* as ontology of the traditional metaphysics, he is more concerned with the question of how one comes to think, how to create concepts in a plane of immanence. Philosophizing in this sense is then a process of reterritorialization on the terrain of concepts in a “milieu of immanence” that requires the development of a particular mode of deterritorialization (WP, 85-88). Concepts imply “only neighborhoods and connections on the horizon” according to a “synthetic and contingent principle – an encounter, a conjunction” (WP, p. 93). Indeed it was David Hume’s empiricism inspired him to take a decisive step in favoring the conjunction over ontology, that is, replacing the IS with AND, valuing the n^{th} power for a relation with “AND...AND...AND...” It’s a philosophy of becoming; a becoming of a philosopher; a philosopher in becoming.

As such, philosophical activity, for Deleuze, is not different from other creative acts such as writing, music making or painting. “Art thinks no less than philosophy, but it thinks through affects and percepts” (WP, p. 66), he says, whereas philosophy thinks on a plane of immanence and makes concepts on a principle of contingent reason (WP, p. 93). It is all a question of tracing the line, which is already pre-philosophy. Indeed for him, philosophy is something paradoxical and inherently so, something that mingles between the (traditionally-speaking) philosophical and the non-philosophical. His own new direction of approaching philosophy is “without” direction: it is something created from encountering the outside, outside of the established domain of philosophy. At the same time, while wanting to get out of traditional philosophy, Deleuze finds himself expanding within it, with all the fresh topological figures and metaphorical concepts as his companions, such as: geophilosophy, geoliterature, cartography, and so on. But not only the Deleuzian geophilosophy is paradoxical in the sense of dwelling in the tension between what is *doxa* and what is non-*doxa*, it is also para-doxical in the more literal sense of the prefix,

para- being understood etymologically in its geographical and dynamic dimension, as “beside, past, or beyond”: a *para-* movement of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. It is a constant play of the inside and the outside, resulting in an expansion of multiplicity within philosophy.

By opening up for himself a philosophical desert to be populated through this process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, a beginning in the middle of the unknown territory, Deleuze insists on this mysterious relationship between the dimension of the unknown and that of the faithful and creative act of philosophizing, that which is stretched to the n^{th} power, to infinity. The overwhelming number of lively concepts produced in any of his works and the lightening-speed movements with which he created them attest to this point. Interestingly, and maybe not surprisingly, reading Deleuze’s work feels very much like reading his own learning experiences, except that instead of being given concrete accounts of them in dramatic or historical manner, we see that he makes all his learning encounters into events, creating concepts, projecting them onto a philosophical surface, making his experiences, in his own conception, “impersonal” and “incorporeal”. He has traced all his learning trajectories or lines of flights into forming a cartography in a plane of immanence that is inundated with new images of thought. Perhaps that is what he means by saying that “a book of philosophy should be in part a very particular species of detective novel, in part a kind of science fiction” (DR, p.xx). By detective novel, he means that concepts are called upon (in the sense of being created at hand) to “resolve local situations” with their “zone of presence”. And these concepts change along with the problems. By science fiction, he means a tracing-out of a world where “individuations are impersonal, and singularities are pre-individual: the splendor of the pronoun ‘one’”; *Erewhon*, “signifying at once the originary ‘nowhere’ and the displaced

disguised, modified and always re-created 'here-and-now'. (DR, p. xxi) To philosophize in this sense is to become nomads, as Deleuze suggests. Since nomads need a desert to begin, a geophilosophic thinking is then to populate a moving desert that one constantly makes through the encounter with outside. Evidently, in this endeavour, whether one is physically traveling or not is of no importance, for what is to be deterritorialized is the thinker-in-becoming.

Indeed, throughout his philosophical life, Deleuze sought many outsiders for thinking with others, with other disciplines or geographies. For him, as he did, to lead a life is to become, to become what one is not yet. To illustrate more concretely with one of his images of philosophizing, it is to release oneself into the function of the "co-functioning" of the "symbiosis", "sympathy", and perhaps symphony also. He says, "There is no need for philosophy: it is necessarily produced where each activity gives rise to its line of deterritorialization. To get out of philosophy, to do never mind what so as to be able to produce it from outside." (Dial., p. 55)

Then, what could Deleuze mean to the field of Education? My first temptation is to simply boldly borrow his phrase above and to propose thus: *There is no need for education: it is necessarily produced where each activity gives rise to its line of deterritorialization. To get out of education, to do never mind what so as to be able to produce it from outside!* Perhaps, it is indeed a Deleuzian repetition⁶ that we can aim for in education, a kind of repetition that is a *transgression*, in which its possibility hinges on opposing as much to moral(*nomos*) law as to natural (*physis*) law (DR, p. 2-3). By working in opposition to the order of the always already-existing laws, in the spirit of *parrhēsia* prefigured by Diogenes the Cynic, Deleuze is proposing new possibilities of working in the direction of creating artistic realities; that is, to treat philosophy itself as an artistic endeavour in its essential nature. And if one is to realize the fundamental role that education plays in forming our frames of thinking, that is, providing

existing and always the dominant images of thought of our society in general, the relevance of Deleuze's analysis and his "anecdotes" of philosophizing is hard to deny. Or, at least we are tempted to make this parallel: that if philosophy can be made fecund with the open-mindedness of an artist, then the work of education can also be made fertile through the exigency of treating it as an artistic engagement, something that not only demands creativity but more importantly a critical consciousness of the ethical dimension that is inherent in education.

To do that concretely, perhaps one thing is to be recognizant of the dogmatic images of thought in the history of knowledge heavily critiqued in Deleuze's works, so as to facilitate our own process of deterritorialization out of the "comfort" zones that these entrenched images of thought often provide and perpetuate through the dominant discourses which in turn manifest themselves in curricula at various levels in the field of education. Also, keeping in mind not only the concrete objections that Deleuze raises regarding the obstinate presence of the *doxa* in its various forms, but also his own encounters with his outside-of-philosophy, of making them events of thinking, we, who are interested in the territory of education, can begin to ask some questions: For instance, what does it mean to attempt to bring Deleuze's work from the "outside" in the proximity of our educational realm, or rather, to extend our ignorance to the edge of the inter-disciplinary borders, to think about curriculum questions *with* his diverse philosophical thinking? If one takes curriculum to mean something akin to a wall or a back-bone to the structure of educational system, how could one approach it in such a way that allows the multiplicities in the creative work of education come to the fore, to "pierce the wall" of curriculum itself, or, to make it porous? What might be the exigencies on us educators ourselves in this kind of attempt? If the attempt to make deterritorialization in the field of education indeed demands a

becoming-nomad of the educator, what do we need to prepare ourselves for that kind of line of flight into the desert of our own ignorance? How do we populate it with the children of our own event in meeting say, Deleuzian works? And ultimately, what kind of experiments of thought could one have in the theory of learning, in this regard? How does one begin again and again, like a refrain, where each repetition already signifies an artistic singularity?

In fact, these Deleuze-spirited questions are not meant to be met with any definite answers, strategies or plan of actions; they are simply a kind of *carte postal* or maybe more appropriately, a *carte d'invitation*, or even a *carte de visite* that is slipped into the crack of the door of anyone who is curious enough to respond to its call, not at all aiming at a *carte-réponse*, but maybe a *cart(e)o-graphie* of her own that draws out a new territory of a re-territorialized desert upon a land that is always already crowded.⁷

Notes

1. I italicize the prepositions here to indicate the special attention to which Deleuze often pays for bringing out the dynamic forces that they bring in the matter of thinking; they could be regarded also as small linguistic device to strike certain resonance with the kind of geographic philosophizing that Deleuzian engages in his work, stand in tension with the default fixity of representation. The “in” of “in Education” ostensibly refers to the situated-ness of this thinking exercise within the terrain of Education; yet, this “in” can paradoxically signal an “out” or “outside” that I attempt here “with” Deleuze. As such, I place a subtle tension that readers may recognize only after reading the whole text, for it is facilitated by an encounter with Deleuze’s concept such as “deterritorialization”, which is what I am trying to introduce here. “With” then stresses the possibility of thinking along with Deleuze’s creative (images) of thought; to be in flight with him through a process of deterritorialization of reading. Reading here not only refers to reading into the contents as concepts, ideas, (i.e. representations of knowledge), but even more so into his creative way

of thinking shown by his style of writing (numerous metaphors, for example) as well as his “anecdotes” of living in philosophy. The “like” serving as a preposition evidently signifies a simile to convey the possibility of having one’s thinking unroots itself, be blown away and then reroots again in a different territory, imitating the way that grass do to populate any crake of fertile land. The use of “a” is hence deliberately used to emphasis both the general ability and the singularity of each rooting of grass.

2. Concerning Deleuze’s work in the intersection between literature and philosophy, a very large volume of collected works in French is published under the title *Deleuze et les écrivains: littérature et philosophie*, edited by Bruno Gelas and Hervé Micolet (Nantes, Édition Cécile Defaut, 2007). This is probably the most comprehensive collection to date that examines and celebrates the work of Deleuze, in which forty-two contributors have come together in one single volume; among them are prominent philosophers, writers, poets, as well as artists. A complete bibliography of Deleuze’s work can also be found in this collection.

3. *The Logic of Sense* is Deleuze’s accompanying book to his doctoral dissertation that is published under the book title *Difference and Repetition* (see bibliography). The form that this “minor” (in a Deleuzian sense, it is far from the common meaning of “less”) book takes is rather unusual (for a contemporary professional philosopher at least), for it was written in series with thirty-four themes or sub-titles and lengthy appendices. In fact, one could almost read it like a collection of short stories! But the decisive form that this book takes, along with its multiple way of thinking, marks Deleuze the philosopher his own creative path to thinking.

4. According to the legend recorded by Diogenes Laërtius, Empedocles perished by throwing himself into the volcanic flames on Mount Etna in Sicily and died at the age of sixty. It is as if this last anecdote of his glorious life and the literal illustration of his commitment into the depth of life, i.e. the earth, were indeed intended by Empedocles to convince his disciples of his immortality by making disappear of his physical body. Yet, one of his metallic (be it lead or bronze) sandals was thrown back to the surface of the earth. In this case, one could either interpret it as an evidence of Empedocles’ deceit; or otherwise, consider it as an enigmatic sign that he indeed has come back as “a

god among men” after being devoured by the fire. However symbolic this return to the earth as a divine might be, this latter interpretation seems to adhere to Empedocles’ view of the cyclic reincarnation of the mortals. He himself though, has exited out of that cycle – only the sandal remained as a messenger to tell of his immortal return.

5. American scholar Gregg Lambert has written an extensive book on the various aspects of Deleuze’s philosophy of non-philosophy, appropriately titled: *The Non-philosophy of Gilles Deleuze*, New York: Continuum, 2002.

6. As the concept of “repetition” with Deleuze is central in his book *Repetition and Difference* (1994/1968), it is here worthwhile to cite a few fragments to help understand its singular meaning:

“Repetition as a conduct and as a point of view concern non-exchangeable and non-substitutable singularities.” (RD, p. 1)

“The repetition of a work of art is like a singularity without concept, and it is not by chance that a poem must be learned by heart. The head is the organ of exchange, but the heart is the amorous organ of repetition. (DR. p.1-2)

“If repetition is possible, it is due to miracle rather than to law. It is against the law: against the similar form and the equivalent content of law. ... If repetition exists, it expresses at once a singularity opposed to the general, a universality opposed to the particular, a distinctive opposed to the ordinary, an instantaneity opposed to variation and an eternity opposed to permanence. *In every respect, repetition is a transgression. It puts law into question, it denounces its nominal or general character in favour of a more profound and more artistic reality.*” (emphasis mine, DR, p. 2-3.)

7. To translate these *Cartes* into English: *Carte-postal*, post card; *carte d’invitation*, invitation card; *carte-de-visite*, visiting card, a kind of note that the French used to use to leave at the door of the person one desire to see but who is absent for the time being, which is also used as wishing card that accompanies a gift; *carte-réponse*, answering-card; *cart(e)-o-graphie*, cartography, which means the art of making maps.

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